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inflation as a meaningful way to interpret the
inflation process in the United States.
One immediate benefit of dropping the empha-
sis on core inflation would be to reconnect the
Federal Reserve with households and businesses
who know price changes when they see them.
With trips to the gas station and the grocery store
being some of the most frequent shopping expe-
riences for many Americans, it is hardly helpful
for Fed credibility to appear to exclude all those
prices from consideration in the formation of
monetary policy.
There are several key arguments that are
commonly used to favor a focus on core inflation
in monetary policy discussions.2 I will argue that
all of them are essentially misguided. Because of
this, the best the central bank can do is to focus
on headline measures of inflation. The headline
measures were designed to be the best measures
of inflation available—the Fed should respect that
construction and accept the policy problem it
poses. Many other central banks have solidified
their position on this question by adopting
explicit, numerical inflation targets for headline
inflation, thus keeping faith with their citizens
C
ontrolling overall inflation is a goal
of monetary policy. Measures of over-
all, or headline, inflation attempt to
include changes in the prices paid for
a wide variety of goods—that is, what households
actually have to pay for their daily purchases.
This is a sensible notion of precisely what the
central bank can and should control over the
medium term.
Many discussions of monetary policy, even
within the central banking community, discuss
movements of subsets of prices instead of the over-
all or headline measure of price changes. The most
famous subset is the “core”—all prices except
those relating to food or energy. Core inflation is
the measured rate of increase of these prices.1
Control of core inflation is not the goal of mone-
tary policy, although it sometimes seems to be,
given the amount of emphasis put on this concept
in the United States.
Many of the old arguments in favor of a focus
on core inflation have become rotten over the
years. It is time to drop the emphasis on core
1 Figures 1 and 2 show core and headline inflation for the consumer
price index (CPI) and the personal consumption expenditures
(PCE) chain price index.
2 See, for instance, Mishkin (2007).
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Figure 1
CPI Inflation Measures: Headline and Core
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Figure 2
PCE Chain Price Index Inflation Measures: Headline and Core
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation April 2011.that they will work to keep headline inflation
low and stable. The Fed should do the same.
THE “VOLATILITY” ARGUMENT
I will start with an easy one, the argument
that headline inflation is more volatile than core
inflation and that, therefore, if monetary policy
reacts systematically to headline inflation the
economy itself would become more volatile. This
could also be termed the “all hell would break
loose” argument.
Yes, it is true that headline inflation tends to
be more volatile than subset inflation measures
that exclude or downweight the most volatile
components. However, I do not think this says
anything about how policy should or should not
react to movements in headline inflation. Any
policy response can of course be adjusted appro-
priately to take into consideration that the price
index contains a certain level of volatility. In other
words, the policy response can be optimized given
the inflation index being targeted. Some monetary
policy simulations that I have seen in this area
simply take an existing policy rule that has been
designed for core inflation and use the same rule
with headline inflation—resulting in increased
volatility in goal variables. That type of experi-
ment is just saying that an inappropriate policy
rule will produce less-than-satisfactory results,
which is hardly surprising.
One might very legitimately turn the headline
volatility question on its head. With core inflation
as the preferred index for monetary policy analy-
sis, the policymaker will tend to react to relatively
small movements in measured core inflation. In
that case, arguably, any policy response has to be
larger—possibly substantially larger—when even
small changes in measured core inflation are
observed in order to execute the optimal policy.
This may be ill-advised to the extent that small
movements in core inflation are, in fact, simply
noise.
Recent experience offers something to ponder
in this regard. While many think that the recent
financial crisis provides an illustration of the
merits of the focus on core inflation, I do not see
it that way at all. During the second half of 2008
and into 2009, headline inflation measured from
one year earlier fell dramatically and in fact moved
into negative territory. This was a signal—one
among many, to be sure—that a dramatic shock
was impacting the U.S. economy. Inflation was
not immune to this shock. The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) reacted appropriately
with an aggressive easing of monetary policy.
Yet the movements in core inflation during this
chilling period were far more muted and sent
much less of a signal that action was required.
There is also the question of the wisdom of
an intermediate target strategy with respect to
inflation. Since headline inflation is the goal for
monetary policy, the introduction of the core
inflation concept as an intermediate target intro-
duces some slippage between the variable the
Committee is reacting to and the ultimate value
of the goal variable. The intermediate target strat-
egy works as follows: The Committee makes a
policy tool adjustment (such as the policy interest
rate), which is designed to target core inflation,
which subsequently impacts headline inflation.
It is not clear that this intermediate target strategy
actually maximizes policy performance with
respect to the overall price index. For that, much
depends on the statistical properties of the rela-
tionship between core inflation and headline
inflation, and that relationship tends to change
over time.
And finally on the topic of the volatility of
headline inflation, the headline index can be
smoothed in any number of other ways that stop
short of ignoring a wide class of important prices
in the economy. One simple way is to consider
headline inflation measured from one year earlier,
but there are many others. To the extent that the
volatility of headline inflation is a problem, there
are better methods of addressing that than to
simply dismiss troublesome prices.
THE “CORE PREDICTS HEADLINE”
ARGUMENT
One popular argument for focusing on core
inflation is that core inflation is a good and con-
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think this is wrongheaded, as well as wrong. Let’s
begin with the “wrongheaded” part. The idea
that core predicts future headline is often based
on univariate models of the inflation process—
that is, ones that try to predict future headline
inflation using only a single variable or a simple
function of a single variable.3 I do not think this
is a good metric for understanding whether core
or headline is the right inflation measure on which
to gauge monetary policy decisions, regardless of
whether it holds up in the data or not. Presumably,
we would want to use a fully specified model to
try to predict headline inflation, the goal variable
with respect to prices, in the United States. The
full model would include measures of expected
inflation, developments in the real economy, the
stance of monetary policy (including the implicit
inflation target), and other variables to help to
predict future headline inflation outcomes. One
could throw all of these variables out in favor of
a single variable—core inflation—when trying to
predict future headline inflation, but presumably
then one would have a misspecified model of the
inflation process in which a simple function of
core inflation is acting as a proxy for all the vari-
ables that are supposed to be important for predict-
ing future headline inflation. In this misspecified
model, a simple function of core inflation may
or may not have been a good predictor of future
headline inflation over a particular time period,
but so what? I do not think this really tells us
anything about whether it is a good idea to key
policy off of core inflation or not.
There is a version of this argument that might
make more sense. That version works like this.
Suppose we have a full model of the inflation
process, one that includes expected inflation,
measures of real activity, and measures of the
stance of monetary policy. We then add core infla-
tion as a variable to this model and assess the
marginal predictive value of core inflation given
all other variables. If the marginal value of adding
core inflation in this context is positive, one might
then have a claim that core inflation contains
some “special” information over and above infor-
mation coming from the rest of the economy con-
cerning the future course of inflation.4 I have not
seen convincing evidence of this type.
But let’s go ahead and consider the merely
“wrong” part of this argument. Let’s examine
whether today’s core inflation is a good predictor
of future headline inflation in the context of a
univariate forecasting model. I do not think the
evidence is very clear on this question. A number
of choices have to be made to even proceed in
this area: the horizon over which to forecast—
let’s say, one year; the function of core inflation
to use, such as a distributed lag, and the length
of that lag; the data sample over which to test the
hypothesis; and the measures of core and head-
line inflation to use. One recent research paper
in this area investigates personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) inflation and standard core
PCE inflation (that is, PCE inflation less food and
energy components) alongside other types of
inflation measures over U.S. data from 1982 to
2005.5 In that paper, standard core PCE inflation
performs relatively poorly as a predictor of future
headline PCE inflation in most of the models
discussed.6 Alternative measures of inflation do
better, such as the trimmed mean measure pro-
duced by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas for
PCE, which is shown in Figure 3.7 Analysis like
this demonstrates that the idea that standard core
inflation forecasts future headline inflation is far
from an obvious conclusion given the U.S. data.8
Many intuitive discussions on the issue of
core versus headline inflation contain the idea
that noise should somehow be stripped out of the
headline inflation measure in order to leave only
the signal component. The energy price compo-
nent of the headline price index often (depending
Bullard
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3 For a bivariate approach, see Kiley (2008).
4 Rich and Steindel (2007) do include simple measures of slack in
conjunction with various measures of core inflation in their statis-
tical model. They find that no one measure of core inflation con-
sistently outperforms others in out-of-sample tests.
5 See Smith (2010).
6 Similar results are discussed in Crone et al. (2008).
7 See Dolmas (2005). The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland con-
structs an analogous measure for CPI (Bryan and Cecchetti, 1994);
see Figure 4.
8 See also the discussion in Faust and Wright (forthcoming),
Thornton (2007), and DiCecio (2007).Bullard
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Figure 3
PCE Inflation Measures: Headline, Core, and Trimmed Mean
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Figure 4
CPI Inflation Measures: Headline, Core, and Median
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Last observation April 2011.on the time period) has the lowest signal-to-noise
ratio, but the food component often does not have
the second-lowest signal-to-noise ratio after 1984;
for this reason, it is not clear that the food com-
ponent should be routinely excluded on this
basis. Also, the concept of a signal-to-noise ratio
contains a notion that the noise component is
stationary, whereas much of the contemporary
worry about commodity prices is that relative
price changes may be much more persistent going
forward than they have been in the past. That
brings us to the “relative price” argument for
confining attention to core inflation.
THE “RELATIVE PRICE” 
ARGUMENT
The U.S. economy has many thousands of
prices, and these prices are adjusting frequently.
This is appropriate relative price adjustment.
The prices are sending signals to households
about what has become more expensive and less
expensive at each moment in time. Think of the
U.S. household sector as one unified household
with a fixed budget constraint. Then if a particular
price goes up, generally speaking another price
has to fall or, alternatively, the expenditure shares
on the two goods have to adjust so that the house-
hold can still meet its budget constraint. Either
way, the household will adjust by changing behav-
ior in response to the changing prices. The price
indexes that are constructed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (for the consumer price index
[CPI]) and by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(for the PCE price index) already make adjustments
for this behavior in various ways, especially in
chain-weighted indexes that adjust expenditure
weights more continuously. In this sense, relative
price movements are already accounted for in
the construction of existing indexes. Therefore,
when the entire price index rises, it really does
mean that there is inflation in the economy.
Appealing to the idea of relative price change to
explain increases in a price index is inappropriate
in most circumstances, at least up to our ability
to measure behavior induced by relative price
changes correctly.
It is often asserted in discussions of this type
that the Fed cannot help the fact that events occur
around the world each day that affect various
prices. Some prices are “out of our control.” This
is certainly true, but this is also true for every sin-
gle price in the price index. Each one is affected
by real supply and demand factors each day, none
of which is susceptible to direct influence by the
Federal Reserve. The only element of control the
Fed has is over general movements in the entire
price index, and only imprecisely over a period
of quarters and years.
The key relative price changes in today’s
global economy are for energy and other com-
modities. Crude oil prices, in particular, are sub-
stantially higher in real terms than they were a
decade ago and constitute a significant fraction
of global expenditure. It is often asserted that
energy prices cannot increase indefinitely—that
a one-time rise in energy prices only temporarily
contributes to inflation—and therefore that it
makes sense to ignore such changes. However,
the logic of relative prices suggests that if house-
holds are forced to spend more on energy con-
sumption, then they have to spend less on the
consumption of all other goods, thereby putting
downward pressure on all other prices (and all
other expenditure shares) in the economy. Ignor  -
ing energy prices would then understate the true
inflation rate, as one would be focusing only on
the prices facing downward pressure because of
changing relative prices.
One might also reasonably question the
“temporary” characterization of the shift in energy
and other global commodity prices. It is certainly
true that we should not expect energy prices to
increase faster than the general price level with-
out limit. But it is also true that there are well-
known examples of long-term secular trends in
certain prices. One example is medical care prices,
which for decades have generally increased faster
than the headline CPI index (Figure 5). Another
example is computing technology, where prices
have more or less continuously declined per unit
of computing power (Figure 6), even as other
prices have continued to rise. So it is possible—
and indeed it does happen—that whole sectors
of the economy experience relative price change
Bullard
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tive, it is at least a reasonable hypothesis that
global demand for energy will outstrip increased
supply over the coming decades as the giant
economies of Asia, particularly India and China,
reach Western levels of real income per capita.
If that scenario unfolds, then ignoring energy
prices in a price index will systematically under-
state inflation for many years.9
SHOULD THE CENTRAL BANK
TARGET A SUBSET OF PRICES?
The last set of arguments in favor of a notion
of core inflation is far more sophisticated, but
also far less established. Up to now we have taken
Bullard
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it for granted that the prices that households
care about include all the prices that households
actually have to pay. This suggests that our exist-
ing headline price indexes are the right ones to
look at when considering what is best for house-
holds. Yet there is some interesting literature that
asks the following question: Can we think of a
theoretical world in which the central bank would
want to target a subset of the prices faced by house-
holds, instead of all the prices, on the grounds
that this policy would be preferred by the house-
holds themselves? We could then call changes in
this subset of prices “core inflation.”
The general answer is that this is indeed pos-
sible, and I believe future research in this area
has to proceed in this direction. But these models,
while interesting, are not ready for prime time,
and so I think for now the best we central bankers
can do is focus on the best measures of overall
inflation we have and attempt to stabilize those.
The key feature of the literature in this area
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Price of Medical Care (CPI: Medical Care) and Overall Price Level (CPI: All Items)
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and author’s calculations. Last observation April 2011.
9 The literature trying to disentangle the recessionary consequences
of temporary oil-price shocks themselves from the consequences
of the monetary policy response to those shocks is interesting but
inconclusive. The results depend on many modeling details. See
Kormilitsina (2011), Leduc and Sill (2004), and Dhawan and
Jeske (2007).sense made precise in the research), while other
prices are fully flexible.10 For instance, one could
posit that the energy price sector is characterized
by fully flexible prices, while the rest of the econ-
omy is characterized by prices that do not adjust
as readily to supply and demand disturbances
and therefore are considered sticky.11 A typical
result from the literature is that it is the sticky
prices that matter more from the perspective of the
households in the model, since those prices are
not clearing markets as effectively as they could
if prices were fully flexible. For this reason, the
central bank might want to focus on a subset of
Bullard
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prices, namely the sticky ones. One could think of
changes in these sticky prices as core inflation.12
This idea has a long way to go to gain general
acceptability, and it is certainly not widely
endorsed even within macroeconomics. But at
least it is one way to think about why it might be
better to focus on a subset of prices instead of the
entire price index.
There is an international version of this argu-
ment as well.13 In one area of research, there
would be a sticky price sector in each country,
and each central bank would provide the optimal
monetary policy by focusing on the sticky price
sector in its own country and ignoring import
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Figure 6
Price of Computing Technology (Equipment and Software Chain Price Index) and Overall Price
Level (GDP Chain Price Index)
NOTE: GDP, gross domestic product.
10 There is plenty of argument about how realistic it is to think that
sticky price assumptions provide an appropriate foundation for
monetary policy intervention. See, for instance, Kehoe and
Midrigan (2007).
11 For a discussion of some of the issues, see Bodenstein, Erceg, and
Guerrieri (2008).
12 See Eusepi, Hobijn, and Tambalotti (forthcoming) for a detailed
discussion of an optimal “cost-of-nominal-distortions index”
built with this idea in mind.
13 See, for instance, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002).different way, and perhaps one that makes a little
bit of sense: Import prices would be excluded from
domestic policy concerns because the foreign
central bank would already be responding to the
prices of its exports in setting its own policy (and
exchange rates are flexible). Still, results like this
depend on a lot of particular assumptions.
At this point in time, ideas like these are not
widely entertained outside academic circles. I
bring this literature up only to illustrate that there
is interesting research about why it may be opti-
mal to focus monetary policy on a subset of prices
instead of a headline price index. But the exist-
ing literature tends to draw distinctions that are
somewhat different from the way practitioners
wish to view this issue. Most practitioners do not
have in mind trying to divide up prices between
those that are more “sticky” and those that are
less so, or between domestic prices and import
prices.14
WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
The theme of my remarks has been that U.S.
monetary policy needs to de-emphasize core
inflation. Core inflation is not the ultimate goal
of monetary policy. I have considered four classes
of arguments for a focus on core inflation and
found all of them wanting. For this reason, I think
the best the FOMC can do is to use headline infla-
tion when looking at the price side of the dual
mandate.
Core versus headline inflation has been a
long-standing issue for the FOMC. The focus on
core inflation in the United States seems to be
more entrenched than in many other countries.
I have argued that the older ideas justifying this
focus have rotted over time—indeed, they proba-
bly made little sense from the start. The FOMC
needs to get a better playbook on this question so
that the Committee can reconnect with American
households, who see price changes daily in many
of the items the Committee seems to exclude from
consideration in making monetary policy.
The headline measures of inflation were
designed to be the best measures of inflation
available. It is difficult to get around this fact
with simple transformations of the price indexes.
The Fed should respect the construction of the
price indexes as they are and accept the policy
problem it poses. To do otherwise may create the
appearance of avoiding responsibility for inflation.
There is widespread agreement that headline
inflation is the goal variable of monetary policy
with respect to prices. Normally one would want
to operate directly in terms of the goal variable
whenever possible. The concept of core inflation
suggests that somehow an intermediate target
strategy with respect to price inflation is optimal
for U.S. monetary policy. As I have outlined in
this article, I do not think this has ever been con-
vincingly demonstrated. In addition, the U.S.
focus on core inflation tends to damage Fed credi-
bility. As I noted in the introduction, many other
central banks have solidified their position on
this question by adopting explicit, numerical
inflation targets in terms of headline inflation,
thus keeping faith with their citizens that they
will work to keep headline inflation low and sta-
ble. The Fed should do the same.
Bullard
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14 For some actual data that attempt to distinguish sticky and flexible
price inflation, see the Inflation Project at the Atlanta Fed
(www.frbatlanta.org/research/inflationproject/data.cfm) and
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